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Abstract  
We analyze polarization in India roughly in the past two and half decades using 
consumption expenditure data. We show that both bipolarization and multidimensional 
polarization (on several dimensions: caste, rural-urban, state, region) have increased since 
the 1990s. In the case of bipolarization, this is a reversal from the earlier trend (in the 
1980s). Overall, our results suggest that the high growth that India has been witnessing 
since the 1990s has been associated with widening disparities. Comparing polarization and 
inequality, we find similarities, but also some differences. Our results therefore underscore 
the importance of studying polarization as distinct from traditional inequality. 
 
Keywords: Polarization; Inequality; Growth in India 
JEL classification: D31, D63. 
 
                                                 
* We thank Satya Chakravarty, Sanjay Reddy and S. Subramanian for a discussion of some of the key ideas. 
For comments on a previous version, we also thank Lars Osberg, Vamsi Vakulabharanam and participants at 
the Fourth Meeting of the Society for Economic Inequality (ECINEQ) in Catania, Italy in July 2011. 
† Contact details: Motiram: Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR), Gen A.K. Vaidya 
Marg, Goregaon (E), Mumbai. 400065. India. Ph, Fax: +91-22-28416546. sripad@igidr.ac.in.  
Sarma, IGIDR, Mumbai. E-mail: nayantara@igidr.ac.in   2 
1. Introduction 
Kingo Gondo (Toshirô Mifune): Why should you and I hate each other? 
Ginjirô  Takeuchi  (Tsutomu  Yamazaki):  I  don’t  know.  I’m  not  interested  in  self-
analysis. I do know my room was so cold in winter and so hot in summer I couldn't 
sleep. Your house looked like heaven, high up there. That’s how I began to hate you. 
      - From Tengoku to Jigoku (“High and Low”), directed by Akira Kurosawa (1963) 
 
Among economists working on inequality, particularly on its implications for 
conflict,  one  idea  that  has  received  considerable  attention  in  recent  times  is 
“polarization.” As discussed below, there are different views of polarization in the 
literature, but at the outset, a broad definition is: “the appearance (or disappearance) 
of groups in a distribution” (Chakravarty 2009, p. 105). In this paper, we explore 
polarization in the Indian context. In this process, we try to both elucidate this idea 
using the Indian example, and deepen our understanding of the transformation that 
India has been going through, roughly in the past two and half decades. 
Why focus on polarization? Several authors (Chakravarty (2009; Ch 4) and 
Esteban  and  Ray  (1994;  2010)  and  the  references  therein)  have  argued  that 
polarization is intimately connected with conflict. In fact, as we discuss below, ideas 
of polarization are quite old, and in their conception, they embody connections with 
conflict.  The  notion  that  a  highly  unequal  or  polarized  society  may  be  prone  to 
conflict has been known for sometime now, not only to social scientists, but also to 
other thinkers (as reflected by the above quote from Kurosawa’s film). What is new 
about the recent literature is that it has rigorously formalized, in an axiomatic manner, 
the  idea  of  polarization.  However,  although  there  are  some  studies,  the  empirical 
literature  lags  considerably  behind  theory.  We  believe  that  to  shed  light  on 
polarization  and  the  factors  that  influence  it,  we  need  more  empirical  studies,   3 
particularly  from  various  kinds  of  contexts  (e.g.  developing  countries,  developed 
countries, societies with considerable ethnic or other heterogeneity etc.). Our paper is 
motivated by this observation. 
Moreover, the axiomatic foundations of polarization (as conceived by several 
authors – see below) are different from those of traditional notions of inequality (e.g. 
as  represented  by  the  Lorenz  curve).  Although  we  are  not  advocating  a 
consequentialist position, we believe that irrespective of axiomatic differences, the 
importance of any new concept can be judged based upon additional insights that it 
can  give,  compared  to  older/more  traditional  concepts.  This  is  an  issue  that  the 
literature on polarization has had to confront from the outset (e.g. Wolfson 1994; 
Zhang and Kanbur 2001; Duclos et al. 2004). While Wolfson (1994) (using Canadian 
data) and Duclos et al. (2004) (using data from the Luxembourg Income Study) find 
enough  support  for  using  polarization  measures  vis-à-vis  traditional  measures  of 
inequality,  Zhang  and  Kanbur  (2001)  (using  Chinese  data)  find  the  contrary,  and 
therefore propose a new index of polarization. Our paper makes a contribution in this 
regard by looking at both inequality (traditionally understood, e.g. through the Gini) 
and polarization in the Indian context. 
What is special about the Indian context? India (along with China) is one of 
the fastest growing economies in the world today,
1 and has therefore captured the 
imagination of many social scientists, philosophers and intelligent lay people around 
the  world.
2  Considerable  literature  has  justifiably  accumulated  on  India’s  growth 
process.
3 While several issues have been investigated, one issue that has attracted 
much  attention  and  controversy  is  how  inclusive  this  growth  process  has  been  – 
whether significant gains have been achieved in poverty reduction, and whether (and 
how much) inequality has changed. On the latter front, studies have been concerned   4 
with inequality in a traditional sense, and to the best of our knowledge no systematic 
study exists on polarization. Our paper therefore aims to fill this gap. 
It is worthwhile to point out here that the study of inequality and polarization 
in the Indian context (as in many other contexts) is far from a purely intellectual 
exercise.  India  has  been  adopting  a  set  of far-reaching  pro-market  policy  reforms 
since  the  early  1990s  (although  there  were  antecedents  for  these  policies  in  the 
1980s). Considerable debate exists on how much one can credit these reforms for the 
growth  that  India  has  been  experiencing,  and  on  the  other  consequences  of  these 
reforms (e.g. poverty reduction). Inequality has emerged as a contentious issue in this 
debate:  on  the  one  hand  are  the  supporters  of  the  reforms  (e.g.  Bhagwati  2010; 
Panagariya 2008, Chapter 8), who argue that inequality is not a cause of concern 
and/or has not worsened, while on the other hand are several authors (e.g. Sarkar and 
Mehta 2010; Vakulabharanam et al. 2010; Himanshu 2007; Sen and Himanshu 2004 
a, b; Nagaraj 2000) who argue that inequality has worsened. Surely, some of this 
disagreement has to do with different data, different ways of measuring inequality, 
and even different ways of thinking about inequality.
4 While we cannot resolve this 
debate by providing definitive answers, we do think that our focus on polarization 
may provide a different/newer perspective. Our study is related to (and in a sense, 
complements) the analysis in Vakulabharanam et al. (2010), who use NSS data to 
map worsening class (based upon occupational categories) inequalities in India. It is 
also related to Sarkar and Mehta (2010), who focus on wage inequality using NSS 
data.  Neither  of  these  studies  deals  with  polarization  or  the  comparison  between 
inequality and polarization trends. 
Whether  growth  in  India  is  leading  to  significant  poverty  reduction  and 
improvement in the material conditions of everyone is a moot point. But, even if this   5 
is  so,  as  some  sociologists  (Bourdieu  1999)  have  emphasized,  an  individual  who 
occupies the lower rungs in any society (particularly one that is growing rapidly and 
accumulating wealth on a large scale) could experience “positional suffering,” which 
to an outsider may appear “unreal.”
5 We consider this to be important and part of our 
motivation for studying polarization in the Indian context derives from this.     
Given the above, we use the Indian National Sample Survey (NSS) data on 
monthly  consumption  expenditure  for  the  years  1983,  1993-94,  and  2004-05,  to 
investigate changes in polarization. A description of this data and our methodology is 
presented below, but at this juncture, it is worth pointing out that the choice of these 
years will allow us to map changes roughly a decade before and after the reforms and 
also allow us to contrast two high growth phases (in the 1980s and since the 1990s). 
Also, 2004-05 is the latest survey that is available right now. A broad summary of our 
findings is as follows: we find that polarization has sharply increased in India since 
the early 1990s. When it comes to “unidimensional” polarization, this is a reversal 
from  the  previous  trend  (i.e.  during  1983-94).  Looking  at  multidimensional 
polarization, we show it this has increased on several fronts (caste, state, region) since 
the early 1990s. Except on the dimension of caste, this is not different from the trend 
during 1983-94 (when it was increasing too), but the increase during 1994-2005 has 
been sharper, i.e. at a more rapid pace. On the dimension of caste, a declining trend 
during 1983-94 was reversed during 1994-2005. Since causality is hard to establish, 
we would like to be cautious and argue that our results suggest that the Indian growth 
process has been associated with increasing disparities. We find some differences in 
polarization and inequality trends, so our belief is that there is merit in exploring 
polarization in various other contexts.   6 
The  remaining  part  of  the  paper  is  organized  into  four  sections.  The  next 
section  presents  a  review  of  the  literature  on  polarization.  Section  3  presents  a 
description of the data and the methodology that we follow. Section 4 presents our 
analysis and results. The final section concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Excellent surveys of the literature on polarization are presented in Chakravarty 
(2009) and Esteban and Ray (2010). In what follows below, we present a description 
of  the  basic  ideas  and  a  brief  summary  of  some  important  studies.  Our  primary 
attempt is to facilitate the readers in understanding the analysis and inferences given 
in the remainder of the paper. 
As mentioned above, in economics, a burgeoning literature on polarization has 
emerged in roughly the past two decades. There are broadly two different notions of 
polarization in this literature. The first, “bipolarization” is motivated by the idea that 
the presence of a sizeable middle class can mute (at least to a certain extent) conflict 
that could arise if the population were to be divided into masses of rich and poor.
6 The 
seminal studies here are Foster and Wolfson (1992) and Wolfson (1994), although the 
idea that the middle class is a stabilizing force is a rather old one and can be traced 
back at least to Aristotle. In The Politics, Aristotle discusses the virtues of the middle 
class and how it can balance the vices of the two extreme classes (i.e. the rich and the 
poor). It is worthwhile to quote Aristotle at length since the polarization literature (to 
the best of our knowledge) has not discussed his insight,
7 which should be located 
within the context of ancient Greek city-states. 
“It is clear then both that the political partnership which operates through the middle class is best, and 
also that those cities have every chance of being well-governed in which the middle class is large, 
stronger if possible than the other two together, or at any rate stronger than one of them. For the   7 
addition  of  its  weight  to  either  side  will  turn  the  balance  and  prevent  the  extravagance  of  the 
opposition” (Aristotle 1962, pp. 172-173). 
The  conception  of  the  process  of  polarization  as  one  in  which  the  middle 
diminishes in importance, breaking up the society into groups (poles) is also old. 
Marx  and  Engels  discuss  the  class  that  stands  in  the  middle  (i.e.  between  the 
proletariat and the capitalists, e.g. the petty bourgeoisie) and its fragility - given the 
likelihood that in the process of capitalist development, people belonging to this class 
could join the ranks of the proletariat: 
“The  lower  strata  of  the  middle  class-the  small  tradespeople,  shopkeepers,  and  settled  tradesmen 
generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants-all these sink gradually into the proletariat, partly because 
their diminutive capital does not suffice for the scale on which Modern Industry is carried on, and is 
swamped in the competition with the large capitalists, partly because their specialized skill is rendered 
worthless by new methods of production” (Marx and Engels [1848] 1978, pp. 479-80). 
They (and Marx separately) also discuss the process of polarization wherein capitalist 
society gets divided into two classes confronting each other - the capitalists and the 
workers.
8 Given the richness of Marx’s insights and the multiple interpretations that 
one can drawn from his work, this maybe a simple description,
9 but it will suffice 
given  our  purpose,  viz.  showing  that  the  idea  of  polarization  had  antecedents  in 
classical thinking. 
Foster  and  Wolfson  (1992)  and  Wolfson  (1994)  demonstrate  the  main 
principles/axioms  that  characterize  the  process  of  polarization
10  and  distinguish  it 
from  inequality  (traditionally  understood).  These  are  “increasing  spread”  and 
“increasing bipolarity.” To illustrate the former, consider an income distribution and a 
transformation  that  makes  a  rich  person  richer  or  a  poor  person  poorer,  without 
affecting the middle (i.e. median). This would result in a movement away from the 
middle, thereby increasing polarization. Also consider a transfer from a poor person   8 
to a rich person across the middle – this would pull both the rich and poor persons 
apart from each other (and away from the middle), thereby increasing polarization. To 
illustrate  increased  bipolarity,  consider  transfers  from  a  richer  person  to  a  poorer 
person on the same  side as the median. This transfer would result in the moving 
together of the richer and poorer persons, with one of these moving closer to the 
middle  and  the  other  moving  away.  Bipolarization  postulates  that  polarization 
increases on account of this transfer. It is important to note the distinction vis-à-vis 
inequality - given that this is a progressive transfer, unlike polarization, all commonly 
used measures of inequality that satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle (e.g. the Gini) 
would show a decrease. In the interests of space, we have not shown figures that 
illustrate the above axioms, but interested readers can refer to Figures B1 and B2 in 
Foster and Wolfson (1992). Wolfson (1994) illustrates how one can tie a measure of 
polarization to the Gini and derives a “polarization curve” (akin to the Lorenz curve) 
that can provide a partial ordering of distributions.
11 Formally, the polarization index 
derived by Wolfson (1994) is: 
 
 
µ and m are the mean and median, respectively. This index lies in [0,0.25]. L(0.5) is 
the ordinate of the Lorenz curve at the 50
th percent, i.e. the share (of income, wealth, 
expenditure etc.) held by the poorer half of the population, and G is the Gini 
coefficient. To make the index fall in the interval [0,1] similar to some commonly 
used inequality indices (e.g. Gini), Wolfson (1994) suggests multiplying the above 
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Note that the above index is a “relative” index in that it satisfies the property of Scale 
Invariance, which says that scaling all incomes (or wealth, expenditure etc.) by a 
common positive factor leaves the index of polarization unchanged. An “absolute” 
counterpart of the above index can be constructed by multiplying it by the median. 
This absolute index satisfies the property of Translation Invariance, which says that 
increasing or decreasing all the incomes (or wealth, expenditure etc.) by the same 
amount, leaves  the index unchanged.
12 
Many studies building upon this work have appeared since the 1990s, and 
these  have  suggested  other  indices  (e.g.  Wang  and  Tsui  2000;  Chakravarty  and 
Majumdar  2001;  Rodriguez  and  Salas  2003).  For  our  purposes,  it  is important  to 
consider the “compromise” relative bipolarization index of Chakravarty (2009, pp. 
115-117),  which  is  based  upon  the  insight  that  polarization  is  concerned  with 
deviations  from  the  middle  (i.e.  median).  The  main  idea  is  to  aggregate  these 
deviations to get a measure of polarization that satisfies  some reasonable  axioms. 
These axioms are Normalization, Symmetry, Population Principle, Increased Spread, 
and Increased Bipolarity (the last two were discussed above). Normalization says that 
for  a  perfectly  equal  distribution,  the  index  of  polarization  is  zero.  Symmetry  is 
essentially anonymity, implying that only the incomes (or wealth, expenditure etc., 
and not the people who possess these) matter. Population principle guarantees that 
cloning the entire distribution does not matter for the index of polarization. Since it is 
a relative index, it also satisfies the property of Scale Invariance (discussed above). 
Chakravarty (2009, p. 117) shows that such an index has the following form: 
  







              (3)   10 
As earlier, m denotes the median, n is the size of the total population, and (x1, x2,…, 
xn) is the distribution. ε is a positive number between 0 and 1. Note that for ease of 
exposition, we have slightly simplified the index by assuming that all the income 
classes are singletons. For a given distribution, the higher the value of ε, the higher is 
the value of the index – this can be seen by differentiating the index with respect to ε. 
ε  is  an  inverse  measure  of  the  degree  to  which  the  index  exhibits  the  increased 
bipolarity property - the lower the value of ε, the larger is the increase in the index 
due to a progressive transfer on either side of the median. This can be verified by 
making a transfer, and then differentiating the change in the index with respect to ε. 
An absolute counterpart of this index can be obtained by multiplying by the median. 
  Given that there are several bipolarization indices, there is a possibility that 
these could disagree. Chakravarty (2009, pp. 117-121) has therefore suggested the 
ideas  of  “relative  bipolarization  dominance”  and  “relative  bipolarization  curve” 
similar  to  the  ideas  of  Lorenz  dominance  and  Lorenz  curve,  respectively  from 
inequality measurement. The idea again is to look at the deviations from the median. 
Formally,  consider  a  distribution 
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median m. The relative bipolarization curve is given by: 
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 is the index for the individual corresponding to the median. Note that on the 
horizontal axis, we have the poorest 1%, 2% etc. of the population: j (=1,2,…,k) is the 
index for an individual and so j/k is the rank of the individual in percentage terms. 
The  ordinate  is  the  aggregate  shortfall  from  a  hypothetical  distribution  where   11 
everyone has an income equal to the median, normalized by the total income in such a 
distribution. A distribution x is said to dominate another distribution y if the relative 
bipolarization curve of the former lies nowhere below (and above for at least one 
point) the same of the latter. In this case, it can be shown that x is characterized by 
higher polarization as compared to y according to all relative bipolarization indices 
satisfying  Increased  Spread,  Increased  Bipolarity,  Symmetry  and  Population 
Principle. As in the case of Lorenz dominance, ambiguous rankings are possible due 
to crossings – in this case, while some indices could give one ranking, other indices 
would give a different ranking. 
  While we have been discussing bipolarization, a second view that one can 
discern in the literature, focuses on polarization in a more general sense - through an 
arbitrary number of groupings based upon income (or expenditure, wealth etc.).
13 This 
has  also  been  referred  to  as  the “identification-alienation”  framework:  individuals 
belonging to a particular group identify with one another and are alienated from those 
belonging to another group. Polarization is a group phenomenon
14 and would increase 
if there is stronger identification among people within a group or if alienation among 
groups is more intense. The seminal studies here are Esteban and Ray (1994) and 
Duclos et al. (2004). Suppose there are n pre-existing groups with group i (i=1,…,n) 
having a size pi and income (or wealth or expenditure) yi. Esteban and Ray (1994) 
characterize the polarization as: 
  
K pi






                     (5) 
K>0  is  a  constant  and  ] 6 . 1 , 1 [       is  a  parameter  that  measures  the  polarization 
sensitivity  of  the  index.  From  the  structure  of  the  index,  the  identification  and 
alienation components are clear: 
 
i p and  j i y y   , respectively. It is also clear that the   12 
higher the value of α, the larger the departure from inequality, which is why α can be 
interpreted  as  capturing  polarization  sensitivity  (Note  that  if α=0,  the  index  boils 
down to the Gini). Duclos et al. (2004) derive an analogue of the above index, which 
can be used to characterize polarization in the case of continuous distributions and 
which has the advantage of not assuming knowledge of any pre-existing income (or 
wealth, expenditure etc.) groups. This index is as given below: 
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Here f is the density function for income and  ] 1 , 25 . 0 [      is (as earlier) a parameter 
that  captures  the  polarization  sensitivity.  With  household  survey  data,  f  is 
approximated by a kernel density function. 
  One point to be noted here, which has not been sufficiently highlighted in the 
polarization literature, is the following. With bipolarization, we are concerned with 
the  middle  class  –  there  is  considerable  amount  of  social  theory  that  tries  to 
understand the middle class and its relationship with other groups in the society, from 
various settings and from different perspectives.
15 We believe that people, in general, 
may have an intuitive understanding of the middle class and/or “the middle” in the 
societies in which they live. In contrast to this, when there are an arbitrary number of 
groups,  the  nature  and  relationship  among  these  groups  has  been  relatively 
underexplored  in  social  theory.  Moreover,  although  some  notions  for  continuous 
distributions (e.g. squeeze) have been formalized and used in axiomatization, it is not 
clear how/how much they correspond with peoples’ notions of polarization. These 
issues have to be kept in mind while interpreting this kind of polarization.  
While the above studies look at polarization on one dimension (e.g. income, 
wealth), a related literature looks at “multidimensional polarization” – here the idea is   13 
that  there  is  more  than  one  dimension  at  play,  e.g.  race  and  income;  caste  and 
expenditure.  The  particular  form  of  multidimensional  polarization  that  we  are 
interested  in,  concerns  a  situation  where  groups  are  defined  in  terms  of  pre-
determined identities (caste, region etc.) and polarization is measured by looking at 
cohesion within a group and differences among groups. As explained in Esteban and 
Ray  (2010)  and  Chakravarty  (2009),  this  is  consistent  with  the  “identification-
alienation” framework that we discussed above. 
  A  relevant  multidimensional  polarization  index  that  we  will  use  is  due  to 
Zhang and Kanbur (2001), which is based upon the single-parameter entropy family 
of indices (Shorrocks and Wan 2005). Very well known and widely used members of 
this family are the log-mean deviation and the Theil. In the presence of subgroups 
(e.g. regions), it can be shown that the overall inequality can be expressed as a sum of 
two components: (i) inequality between subgroups, and (ii) a weighted average of the 
inequality within subgroups. Zhang and Kanbur (2001) use the ratio of the between-
group component to the within group component as an index of polarization. This 
seems reasonable to us given that if there is no alienation across groups, the between 
component would be zero; similarly, if there is perfect identification among groups, 
the within component would be zero (thereby making the index large - tending to 
infinity). However, two limitations of this index are worth discussing. First, as noted 
by Esteban and Ray (2010), the implicit assumption here is that identification within 
and alienation among subgroups is based upon incomes – an assumption that may, or 
may not hold. Second, suppose that both the between and within components fall (or 
rise)  by  the  same  factor,  polarization  does  not  change  –  however,  inequality  has 
clearly changed (Jayadev and Reddy 2011).
16   14 
  Before concluding this section, we would like to add that in our reading, the 
literature  on  polarization  is  still  unsettled  and  evolving  –  much  still  needs  to  be 
achieved  in  terms  of  clarifying  concepts,  axioms  and  measurement.  However,  we 
believe that there is “something out there” in the concept of polarization which cannot 
be captured by traditional inequality, and which the literature is trying to discover and 
conceptualize. Our paper partly attempts to throw light on this by focusing on the 
Indian context. 
  Also, while the axiomatic approach has its strengths, axioms in social sciences 
are many times not taken literally as axioms, but rather as assumptions about the real 
world.
17 Given this, the following questions (which are also relevant in the context of 
inequality measurement) arise: are the axioms of polarization “realistic”? Do they 
correspond with subjective notions that individuals or groups hold? In our opinion, 
more work needs to be done to clarify this although Foster and Wolfson (1992) and 
Wolfson (1994) present some evidence (based upon Amiel and Cowell (1992)) to 
argue that people do hold beliefs that justify the use of the notion of bipolarization. 
Moreover, if axioms are treated as “desirable properties,” then it is not entirely clear 
whether it is unproblematic to take certain axioms used in inequality measurement 
(e.g. anonymity, replication invariance) and use these in the context of polarization, 
particularly if criticisms have been raised  about them in the context of inequality 
measurement.
18 This is another issue on which more work needs to be done. These 
caveats (or rather limitations of the polarization literature) have to be kept in mind 
while interpreting the analysis and results below. 
3. Description of the Data and Methodology 
  The data that we use is from the Indian National Sample Surveys (NSS) on 
household consumption expenditure for the years 1983 (38
th round), 1993-94 (50
th   15 
round) and 2004-05 (61
st round). As mentioned above, the choice of these years will 
allow us to map changes roughly a decade before and after the reforms, and allows us 
to contrast two high growth phases – in the 1980s and since the 1990s.
19 The data 
from these rounds is comparable, and we therefore do not need to worry about the 
incomparability  issue  that  had  plagued  some  earlier  studies  –  essentially  due  to 
differences  in  survey  methodology,  data  from  the  55
th  round  (1999-2000)  is  not 
comparable to that from the other rounds (see e.g. Sen and Himanshu 2004 a, b; 
Himanshu  2007).  These  are  well  known,  large,  nationally  representative  surveys 
conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) that are widely used 
by researchers working on India. For example, in the 61
st round, 79,726 (45,346) 
households and 403,207 (206,529) individuals were surveyed in rural (urban) areas 
spread  across  all  the  states  and  union  territories of  India  (NSSO  2007,  p.3).  The 
sample design, estimation procedure and schedule used are well known and available 
in NSS reports for various rounds, e.g. for the 61
st round, in Appendices B and C of 
NSSO (2007).
20 
At  the  outset,  it  is  important  to  discuss  certain  limitations  of  the  data  for 
researchers studying inequality and polarization. Jayadev et al. (2007 a, b) discuss 
them in the context of wealth inequality, but they are relevant for inequality analysis 
in general, and also for polarization. Essentially, there is under-representation of the 
very rich/wealthy in the sample – we do not expect them to answer the survey; to the 
extent that the rich do answer the survey, there may also be under-valuation and 
under-reporting of their expenditure. The survey design does not adequately take care 
of these. Since expenditure (like income or wealth) is usually unequal, a systematic 
under-representation or under-valuation of the rich will lead to an underestimation of 
inequality and polarization. Moreover, when we are looking at changes in inequality   16 
and polarization, the direction of the bias is not clear (since there is underestimation in 
both  the  initial  and  final  periods).  However  (as  discussed  below),  given  these 
limitations, we have reasons to believe that our results are only stronger – i.e. since 
we find that polarization has increased, we may be underestimating the magnitude of 
the increase. 
  In line with many studies on India that have used NSS surveys and focused on 
inequality in consumption expenditure (e.g. Deaton and Dreze 2002; Himanshu 
2007), we focus on nominal values. Since most measures that we (and others) use are 
relative, the real versus nominal distinction is relevant only because we need different 
deflators for different types of individuals (belonging to different regions, 
occupations, classes etc.).
21 Such indices/deflators, to the extent that they are available 
or can be constructed, are not without their own problems. This maybe one reason 
why, as discussed above, many studies on Indian inequality have focused on 
inequality in nominal consumption expenditure. Also, the studies that have used such 
indices and looked at inequality in real expenditures have not found a very different 
trend/scenario from those that looked at nominal expenditures (e.g. compare the 
trends in Himanshu 2007 and Krishna and Setupathy 2011). 
Moreover, to the extent that we would like to compare trends in inequality to 
those of polarization, the nominal-real distinction is not important. Finally, in making 
inter-personal or inter-group comparisons (which is at the heart of polarization), we 
believe that there may be an equally valid case for using nominal values.
22 
4. Analysis and Results 
  Table 1 presents some polarization indices at the rural, urban, and all-India 
levels for the years 1983, 1993-94 and 2004-05 for monthly per-capita consumption 
expenditure. We have presented the Wolfson index P
W (see pp. 7-8 above) that lies in   17 
the  range  [0,1]  because  doing  so  will  make  comparisons  with  the  Gini  more 
convenient. Since this is just four times the other index P
W* (which lies in [0,0.25]), 
all the results are identical, irrespective of which of the two indices are used. As we 
can see, for rural India, the Wolfson index falls during 1983-93, but then rises sharply 
during 1994-2005 (although in 2004-05, it still remains below the level in 1983). For 
urban  India,  it  remains  virtually  the  same  during  1983-93,  but  then  shows  a 
pronounced rise during 1994-2005. At the all-India level, the index shows a slight 
downward trend in 1983-93 and a substantial upward trend during 1994-2005. The 
compromise bipolarization index shows a similar trend as the Wolfson index. How 
does this compare with the trends in inequality? When we look at either the Gini or 
the generalized single-parameter family of indices (see Tables 1 and 4) at the all-India 
level, we can see that the patterns are similar, i.e. slight decrease during 1983-93 and 
sharp increase during 1994-2005. However, the polarization indices are falling more 
rapidly during 1983-93: the Gini fell by 1.3%, and the log-mean deviation by 0.3%, 
whereas the Wolfson and the compromise bipolarization indices fell by 1.5% and 
2.3%,  respectively.
23  During  1994-2005,  the  rates  of  increase  in  the  polarization 
indices is somewhat lower compared to the same of Gini and much lower than that of 
log-mean deviation (or Theil): the percentage increases of Gini, log-mean deviation, 
Wolfson and compromise bipolarization indices are 11.6%, 23.9%, 10.7% and 10.1%, 
respectively.  Overall,  at  the  rural,  urban
24  and  all-India  levels,  polarization  and 
inequality display similarities, but also differences. We will discuss this issue and its 
implications in greater detail below. 
Insert Table 1 here 
It is also worthwhile to investigate increases in polarization further, to see 
what is driving the changes in polarization. For this purpose, we will look at the   18 
Wolfson index, which is calculated based upon the ratio of the mean to the median, 
the share of consumption held by the poorer half of the population (i.e. the Lorenz 
ordinate at 50%) and the Gini. At the all-India level, the share of the expenditure held 
by the poorer half of the population, which showed a minor rise during the period 
1983-93 (by less than a percentage point) fell in a pronounced manner during the 
period 1994-2005 (by more than two percentage points). The ratio of the mean to the 
median, which was rising moderately in the period 1983-93 (by about two percentage 
points) rose sharply during the period 1994-2005 (by about nine percentage points). 
These figures reinforce the basic story that the polarization indices are telling, viz. the 
declining importance of the middle (median) in the later (post-reform) period.  
One point to note here is that we are talking about the decline of the median, 
which should not be confused with the “Indian middle class,” or the “Indian new 
middle class” – as these terms have been used by some social scientists (sociologists, 
anthropologists  etc.)  to  refer  to  educated,  professional/white-collar  and  largely 
urbanized people in India (e.g. Fernandes 2006). This assumes particular significance 
given the classical literature that we discussed above and the literature on inequality 
and polarization from developed countries. In fact, at the all-India level in 2004-05, if 
we look at the people below or at the median (i.e. the poorer 50%), about 89% of 
them live in rural areas; about 80% belong to  disadvantaged groups
25 (Scheduled 
Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST) or Other Backward Classes (OBC) with about 37% 
SC or ST and about 43% OBC). Needless to say (given the high rural percentage) 
most of these individuals are involved in agriculture. When we focus on rural areas, 
the  poorer  50%  in  2004-05  comprise  largely  of  SC,  ST  and  OBCs  (proportions 
comparable  to  those  at  the  all-India  level)  and  are  either  agricultural  laborers 
(landless) or small farmers (less than 2 hectares). When we focus on urban areas, the   19 
poorer half largely comprises of (about 65%) SCs and OBCs
26 and those in low-
skilled/low-paying occupations, with those involved in “elementary occupations” (e.g. 
street  vendors,  garbage  collectors,  domestic  helpers)  being  the  highest  (28%), 
followed by clerks (19%) and plant and machine operators and assemblers (10%).
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  As discussed in Section 2 (literature review), there seems to be no consensus 
on  the  right  index  to  measure  bipolarization  –  there  are  several  indices  that  are 
possible. We therefore construct the Relative Bipolarization (RB) curve that we have 
discussed earlier for each of the three periods. The data used to construct the curves 
are shown Table 2 and the RB curves for 1993-94 and 2004-05 are shown in figure 1. 
What can we say based upon these? The RB curves for the years 1983 and 1993-94 
look very close to each other (which is the reason why we do not present the RB 
curve for 1983 in figure 1). The RB curve for 1983 mostly lies above the same for 
1993-94, but there is a crossing around the 80
th percentile. This implies that although 
the Wolfson and compromise bipolarization indices agree (as discussed above), there 
is an ambiguity in comparing polarization in 1983 and 1993-94. However, given that 
the difference is small (i.e. the curves lie close to each other), we do not want to 
overemphasize it. The result is different when we compare the RB curves for 1993-94 
and 2004-05 – the RB curve for 2004-05 lies everywhere above the same for 1993-94 
(except of course at 0 and 50%), as can be seen from figure 1. As we discussed above, 
this implies that polarization is higher in the latter period according to all measures 
that  satisfy  Increased  Spread,  Increased  Bipolarity,  Symmetry  and  Population 
Principle. Essentially, what this implies is that although there are many indices of 
polarization, as long as any index satisfies the above axioms, it would indicate that 
polarization has increased during 1994-2005. We believe that this is a strong and 
unambiguous result that is worth emphasizing. The departure between 1993-94 and   20 
2004-05 is more pronounced after the 80
th percentile, which would imply that the very 
rich/wealthy  are  much  better  off  (relative  to  the  middle/median)  in  2004-05,  as 
compared to their counterparts in 1993-94. Given the limitations of the data that we 
mentioned in Section 3 (underrepresentation, underreporting etc.), we believe that the 
difference between 1993-94 and 2004-05 is likely to be more pronounced than what 
we have found – we discuss reasons for this in the concluding section. 
Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 here 
  As discussed above, at the all-India level, the trends in polarization are similar 
to those of inequality, although there are some differences. To shed further light on 
this, we take a disaggregated view. Table 3 presents the Wolfson and Gini indices for 
the  major  Indian  states  in  1993-94  and  2004-05.  As  we  can  observe,  there  are 
differences in the trends for polarization and inequality in both the periods: e.g. in 
1993-94, Bihar has a lower Gini, but a slightly higher Wolfson index as compared to 
Jammu & Kashmir; Orissa has a higher Gini, but a lower Wolfson index compared to 
Rajasthan. In 2004-05, Jammu & Kashmir has a lower Gini, but a higher Wolfson 
index compared to Rajasthan (the comparison of Orissa and Uttar Pradesh is similar). 
The time trends for Gini and Wolfson index are also different for some states, e.g. 
Jammu and Kashmir, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. 
Insert Table 3 here 
  An interesting issue that we can explore is the relationship between growth 
and polarization. In figure 2, we present a scatter plot of the growth rates in various 
states (in terms of real per-capita Net State Domestic Product) and the rate of change 
in polarization. This data is also presented in table 3 - the correlation coefficient 
between these two rates is 0.29. As we can observe, there is a modest, but positive 
relationship  –  states  that  have  higher  growth  rates  have  also  experienced  higher   21 
increases in polarization. This is some evidence that the growth process in India has 
gone  along  with  increased  polarization,  although  we  would  advise  caution  in 
interpreting this as a causal linkage. When we do a similar exercise with inequality 
(i.e. Gini), the results are similar in the sense that growth is associated with increased 
inequality, but the correlation is stronger (0.32). 
Insert Figure 2 here  
  The  literature  on  inequality  in  India  has  not  really  explored  the  case  of 
absolute inequality, except in the case of wealth (Jayadev et al. 2007a), so we do not 
want to say much about it (and hence do not report our computations in Table 1). 
When we compare the changes in absolute inequality (as measured by the absolute 
Gini)  and  polarization  as  measured  by  absolute  indices  (Wolfson  or  compromise 
bipolarization), we observe a steady increase. The absolute Ginis in 1983, 1993-94 
and 2004-05 are 40.53, 105.85, and 248.43, respectively; the corresponding values for 
the absolute Wolfson index (obtained by multiplying the relative Wolfson index (P
W) 
and the median) are 25.78, 66.01, and 143.40, respectively. 
  When we move from bipolarization to polarization based upon an arbitrary 
number of groups, we will focus upon the index proposed by Duclos et al. (2004). 
The index is given in Table 1 for rural, urban and all-India levels for the three periods. 
Although there are minor differences, the broad picture that we get is similar to that 
from bipolarization indices – essentially, polarization was stable during 1983-93, but 
rose sharply during 1994-2005. Given the possibility of several indices, the issues that 
one  has  to  confront  when  we  move  to  an  arbitrary  number  of  groups  (which  we 
discussed earlier, in the literature survey) and the sharp and unambiguous result that 
we have obtained from bipolarization, we are much more comfortable with our results   22 
on  bipolarization.  However,  we  reiterate  that  the  trends  from  both  notions  of 
polarization are roughly similar. 
  Coming now to multi-dimensional polarization, there are several cleavages in 
the  Indian  society  (like  in  many  other  societies)  and  therefore  there  are  several 
dimensions on which disparities could manifest themselves. We have analyzed some 
of these dimensions and the results are reported in Table 4. 
Insert Table 4 here 
One dimension that would naturally occur to any observer of India is caste. 
Caste  is  of  course  a  complex  phenomenon  that  continues  to  attract  tremendous 
amount of interest among various social scientists even today.
28 The NSS data allows 
us to do very little justice to this complex notion. Having said this, we can definitely 
compare the Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST) and others. The SCs and 
STs are historically disadvantaged groups, and broadly speaking, we can consider 
them to occupy the lower rungs of the Indian caste system. These are the only caste 
groups that are enumerated in 1983 and 1993-94. In 2004-05, the Other Backward 
Classes  (OBCs)  are  also  enumerated.  OBCs  are  disadvantaged  groups  which  are 
considered  to  be  upwardly  mobile  (particularly  in  rural  areas)  and  are  broadly 
speaking better off than SCs and STs. We use the Zhang-Kanbur index to investigate 
polarization among caste groups. Looking at Table 4, we can observe that, whether 
we use the log-mean deviation or Theil to compute the Zhang-Kanbur index, in rural 
India, there is a decline in polarization during 1983-93, but an increase – in fact, a 
substantially sharp one during 1994-2005. In urban India (again irrespective of log 
mean deviation or Theil), we see an increase in polarization during both 1983-93 and 
1994-2005, but the increase during the latter period is rather sharp. As a result, at the 
all-India level, polarization increases slightly during 1983-93, but substantially during   23 
1994-2005. In making the above observations, we have to keep in mind the fact that 
in the survey in 2004-05, four caste groups have been enumerated (SC, ST, OBC and 
others), whereas in the other years, only three (SC, ST and others) were enumerated. 
We have recalculated the polarization index, by combining the OBCs with the others 
and this is also reported in Table 4. As we can see, the basic story of decreasing 
polarization during 1983-93 and increasing polarization during 1994-2005 remains, 
even after the recalculation. However, polarization in 2004-05 (and hence the rate of 
increase in polarization during 1994-2005) is not as sharp as in the previous case (i.e. 
where the OBCs were separately enumerated). On the face of it, this seems puzzling, 
and therefore needs an explanation. Why would the same population display higher 
polarization when it is divided into four groups (SC, ST, OBC, and non-SC/ST/OBC) 
as compared to when it is divided into three groups (SC, ST, and non-SC/ST)? To see 
the  reason,  note  that  since  the  OBCs  and  non-SC/ST/OBCs  are  fundamentally 
different, when we combine them, the group so formed would be more unequal than 
each  of  its  constituents  (i.e.  the  OBCs  and  the  non-SC/ST/OBCs).  However,  the 
shares of population and shares of expenditure of the new group would be equal to the 
sum of the shares of its constituents. As a result, the within component of inequality 
would  rise  and  the  between  component  of  inequality  would  fall  (since  the  total 
inequality has to remain the same), leading to a fall in polarization. While this is a 
somewhat technical explanation, essentially what is happening is that combining these 
two disparate groups results in a “more fuzzy” group, thereby bringing down the total 
identification and alienation (in the language of Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos 
et al. 2004). The fall in polarization would of course imply that the rate of increase in 
polarization during 1994-2005 is lower with four caste groups as compared to the 
same with three groups.   24 
Another divide on which considerable interest exists in the Indian context is 
the rural-urban one. Several studies (e.g. Mishra and Reddy 2009; Vakulabharanam et 
al.  2010;  Vakulabharanam  and  Motiram  2011)  have  pointed  out  both  increasing 
agrarian  distress  since  late  1990s  and  increasing  rural-urban  disparities.  A  much 
remarked upon manifestation of agrarian distress is the phenomenon of suicides of 
thousands of farmers in various regions of India since the late 1990s (Mishra and 
Reddy 2009). When we look at rural-urban polarization, we can observe that it has 
been rising since the 1980’s, and stands at a very high value of 23.69% (19.01%) 
using the log mean deviation (Theil). It may not be a coincidence that among the 
various cleavages that we examine, the rural-urban one is characterized by the most 
polarization.  Given  the  substantial  amount  of  evidence  that  has  accumulated,  we 
believe that rural-urban disparity is the starkest among the various disparities that 
exist in India today. 
Given the concern expressed among both academics and policymakers that 
disparities among various geographical regions are increasing and that some states are 
being left behind (e.g. Dreze and Sen 2002), we examine polarization among various 
Indian states. As we can observe, the polarization has been increasing steadily since 
the 1980s. We also divided the country into five regions (North, East, West, South 
and North East) and looked at changes in polarization. As we can observe, there has 
been a steady increase in polarization since the 1980s. The idea that is really driving 
this concern for regional disparity is that those states that are already relatively poor 
would see their position worsening. In India, much literature exists on the so-called 
BIMARU states (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh), which have 
been found to lag behind other states on several development indicators. We therefore 
explored the polarization between the BIMARU states and other states. As we can   25 
observe, this has been increasing since the 1980s. However, the period 1983-93 has 
seen  a  slight  increase,  whereas  the  period  1994-2005  has  seen  a  much  sharper 
increase. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
  There are two audiences that this paper has been addressed to. First is the 
audience  that  is  interested  in  the  Indian  growth  process  –  has  this  process  been 
inclusive,  or  has  it  worsened  pre-existing  cleavages?  Our  main  message  to  this 
audience is that the growth process in India since the 1990s has been associated with 
an increase in polarization. This is true whether we are looking at bipolarization, or 
polarization  with  an  arbitrary  number  of  groups,  or  at  polarization  in  a 
multidimensional sense – on the lines of caste, sector (rural-urban), state or region. 
Since the inequality trends are broadly similar  at the all-India level (more on the 
comparison  between  inequality  and  polarization  below),  we  believe  that  this  says 
something  about  this  growth  process  –  irrespective  of  the  different  measures  and 
different concepts/axioms that one is using, as long as one focuses on consumption 
expenditure (which is widely used, including as a proxy for income), one finds that 
the growth process has been associated with widening disparities. Also, given the 
limitations of data (undersampling, underreporting etc., that we discussed earlier) the 
degree of polarization that we find is in all likelihood an underestimate. Moreover, the 
increases in polarization are also likely to be larger than what we have found, given 
that opportunities for wealth/income accumulation are much higher in 2004-5.
29 
  Given that the idea of polarization is motivated by its connection with conflict, 
should we be concerned about the existing level of conflict in India, and that conflict 
would increase in the future? How do we link the evidence on polarization in India to 
potential conflict, or measures of conflict, or actual instances of conflict? These are   26 
difficult questions to answer, and are beyond the scope of this paper - much more 
research needs to be done on this front, including conceptualization and measurement 
of  the  extent  of  conflict.  There  are  many  sources  of  conflict  in  India  (e.g. 
income/wealth, caste, region, religion etc.) and these may interact with one another in 
a complex manner. So, we can only offer sketchy and speculative remarks. Having 
said this, we would like to point out that anecdotal evidence exists to suggest high and 
increasing level of conflict on the geographical/spatial dimension – among regions 
within a state, between richer and poorer states and between rural-urban areas. In a 
way, our findings on multidimensional polarization are consistent with this.
30 Sharp 
increases in bipolarization in certain states that have witnessed enormous violence and 
conflict (e.g. Gujarat, which in 2002, saw one of the worst instances of religious 
conflict in post-independence India) are also unsurprising from this perspective. It is 
also possible that the extent and patterns of accumulation and consumption
31 by the 
Indian elite may contribute to tensions in the future.
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  The second audience that this paper is addressed to is one that is interested in 
polarization  and  inequality.  We  have  presented  patterns  of  polarization  from  a 
concrete and interesting context. In comparing polarization and inequality, we have 
found mixed results – while the trends at an all-India level are similar for inequality 
and polarization, the magnitudes of changes and the disaggregated trends are different 
between these two. The linkages to growth are also different. Overall, we believe that 
our results highlight the importance of studying polarization and the need for more 
empirical studies that will help tease out how inequality and polarization play out in 
particular contexts.   27 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Polarization Indices for Monthly Per-Capita Expenditure 
  Mean/ 
Median  L(0.5)








Rural             
1983  1.196  0.295  0.309  0.241  0.326  0.204 
1993-94  1.187  0.310  0.286  0.222  0.298  0.197 
2004-05  1.226  0.302  0.305  0.227  0.307  0.206 
Urban             
1983  1.272  0.273  0.342  0.283  0.376  0.220 
1993-94  1.277  0.273  0.344  0.284  0.377  0.223 
2004-05  1.328  0.252  0.376  0.317  0.420  0.237 
All India             
1983  1.235  0.283  0.330  0.259  0.349  0.213 
1993-94  1.258  0.287  0.326  0.255  0.341  0.215 
2004-05  1.347  0.266  0.363  0.283  0.375  0.234 
 
Source: Authors’ computation from NSS data. For a description of these indices and 
formulae, see section 2. 
Notes: 
a. Lorenz ordinate for 50 percent – share of expenditure held by the poorer half. 
b. Computed for ε=0.3 
c. Duclos, Esteban and Ray index (Duclos et al. 2004). Computed using the STATA 
module DASP (Distribution Analysis Stata Package) for α=0.5 with the fast option for 
kernel density estimation. In the interests of space, we are not reporting the standard 
errors, lower and upper bounds. But, these are available upon request 
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Table 2: Data for the Relative Bipolarization Curves 
j/k  RB(x,j/k) 
  1983  1993-94  2005-06 
0%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00% 
5%  11.67%  11.01%  11.25% 
10%  9.13%  8.67%  8.88% 
15%  6.99%  6.65%  6.85% 
20%  5.16%  4.94%  5.09% 
25%  3.62%  3.47%  3.58% 
30%  2.35%  2.26%  2.34% 
35%  1.34%  1.29%  1.34% 
40%  0.61%  0.59%  0.61% 
45%  0.16%  0.15%  0.16% 
50%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
55%  0.16%  0.16%  0.17% 
60%  0.65%  0.64%  0.70% 
65%  1.52%  1.52%  1.64% 
70%  2.83%  2.83%  3.10% 
75%  4.69%  4.68%  5.17% 
80%  7.20%  7.20%  8.05% 
85%  10.58%  10.63%  12.01% 
90%  15.27%  15.38%  17.64% 
95%  22.23%  22.43%  26.17% 
 
Source: Authors’ Computation from NSS Data 
Note: For details of the computation, see section 2.   35 
Table 3: State-Level Inequality and Polarization Indices 
State  Growth
a  Gini  Wolfson (P
W)  ΔW
b 
  %  1993-94  2004-05  1993-94  2004-05  % 
Andhra Pradesh  4.75  0.312  0.345  0.240  0.258  0.66 
Assam  1.48  0.216  0.240  0.159  0.176  0.94 
Bihar  2.29  0.253  0.259  0.197  0.191  -0.30 
Gujarat  5.07  0.279  0.334  0.215  0.284  2.87 
Haryana  3.90  0.311  0.355  0.254  0.266  0.42 
Himachal Pradesh  5.01  0.325  0.328  0.233  0.238  0.18 
Jammu & Kashmir  1.93  0.270  0.260  0.195  0.230  1.61 
Karnataka  5.29  0.309  0.361  0.252  0.276  0.88 
Kerala  4.76  0.316  0.393  0.235  0.305  2.70 
Madhya Pradesh  2.07  0.315  0.357  0.243  0.256  0.51 
Maharashtra  3.54  0.376  0.393  0.319  0.335  0.46 
Orissa  3.54  0.282  0.324  0.214  0.254  1.70 
Punjab  2.54  0.285  0.351  0.226  0.268  1.70 
Rajasthan  4.33  0.280  0.303  0.223  0.205  -0.71 
Tamil Nadu  4.15  0.344  0.379  0.261  0.299  1.31 
Uttar Pradesh  1.91  0.302  0.327  0.276  0.243  -1.08 
West Bengal  5.58  0.308  0.353  0.227  0.258  1.26 
 
Source: Authors’ Computation from NSS Data. Growth rates computed based upon 
the data available from the EPW Research Foundation. 
Notes: 
a. Average annual (compound) growth rate for per-capita Net State Domestic Product. 
Three new states Chattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand were created after 1993-94 
by separating them from Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, respectively. In 
the series provided by the EPW Research foundation, in both periods, data for these 
newer states is given separately from the states that they were earlier part of. So, we 
included these new states in their “parent” states (i.e. Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and 
Uttar Pradesh) and computed for both periods the per-capita NSDP and its growth. 
b. Average annual (not compounded) percentage change in the Wolfson index.    36 
Table 4: Multidimensional Polarization 
Subgroups  Log Mean Deviation  Theil 
  W  B  T  B/W (%)  W  B  T  B/W (%) 
1. Castes 
Rural                 
1983  0.147  0.007  0.154  5.016  0.177  0.007  0.184  3.967 
1993-94  0.131  0.006  0.137  4.693  0.165  0.006  0.171  3.591 
2004-05 (I)  0.144  0.012  0.156  8.288  0.194  0.012  0.206  6.134 
2004-05 (II)  0.147  0.008  0.156  5.696  0.198  0.008  0.206  4.060 
Urban                 
1983  0.184  0.004  0.189  2.428  0.211  0.004  0.215  1.985 
1993-94  0.189  0.007  0.195  3.623  0.233  0.006  0.239  2.715 
2004-05 (I)  0.207  0.026  0.233  12.355  0.258  0.025  0.283  9.796 
2004-05 (II)  0.223  0.010  0.233  4.274  0.275  0.009  0.283  3.189 
All India                 
1983  0.166  0.009  0.176  5.631  0.199  0.009  0.207  4.424 
1993-94  0.165  0.010  0.175  6.359  0.210  0.010  0.220  4.705 
2004-05 (I)  0.189  0.028  0.217  14.771  0.252  0.028  0.281  11.193 
2004-05 (II)  0.202  0.015  0.217  7.311  0.267  0.014  0.281  5.142 
2. Rural/Urban 
1983  0.162  0.013  0.176  8.302  0.193  0.014  0.207  7.402 
1993-94  0.151  0.024  0.175  15.768  0.195  0.025  0.220  13.077 
2004-05  0.175  0.042  0.217  23.690  0.236  0.045  0.281  19.010 
3. State 
1983  0.164  0.011  0.176  6.781  0.196  0.012  0.207  6.003 
1993-94  0.157  0.018  0.175  11.605  0.200  0.020  0.220  9.974 
2004-05  0.189  0.028  0.217  14.541  0.252  0.028  0.281  11.198 
4. Region 
1983  0.173  0.003  0.176  1.762  0.205  0.003  0.207  1.462 
1993-94  0.170  0.005  0.175  2.794  0.216  0.005  0.220  2.132 
2004-05  0.209  0.008  0.217  4.003  0.273  0.008  0.281  2.967 
5. BIMARU 
1983  0.171  0.004  0.176  2.570  0.203  0.004  0.207  2.131 
1993-94  0.170  0.005  0.175  2.740  0.183  0.005  0.188  2.601 
2004-05  0.206  0.011  0.217  5.413  0.270  0.011  0.281  4.028 
 
Source: Authors’ Computations based upon NSS data. 
Notes: 
a. W: Within component; B: Between Component; T: Total; B/W: Between/Within   37 
b. For caste decomposition, 2004-05 (I) and (II) refer to when the OBC are separately 
included, and when they are added to “Others”, respectively. 
c. See note (b) for table 3 above. We have used the same procedure in the state level 
decomposition, i.e. in 2004-05 we have taken the newer states and combined them 
with their parent states. 
d. Regions: North, South, East, West and North East. North includes Jammu & 
Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarkhand, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, 
Chattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Delhi, and Chandigarh. South includes Andhra 
Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andaman, Lakshadweep, Pondicherry. East 
includes Bihar, West Bengal, Jharkhand, and Orissa. West includes Rajasthan, 
Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Daman-Diu, and Dadra. North East includes Sikkim, 
Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya, Assam. 
e. BIMARU: Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. For this 
decomposition too, in 2004-05, we have combined the newer states with their parents.   38 
Figure 1: Relative Bipolarization Curves for 1993-94 and 2004-05 
 
 
Note: For the data that is used to construct these curves, see table 2  39 
Figure 2: Relationship Between State Level Growth and Change in Polarization 
 
Note: 
a. See table 3 for a description of the growth rates and changes in polarization. 
                                                 
1 The average annual growth rates of real GDP (at factor cost, at 1993-94 prices) during the periods 
1950-51 to 1979-80, 1980-81 to 1990-91, and 1991-92 to 2004-05 are 3.5%, 5.4% and 5.9%, 
respectively. The corresponding figures for real GDP per-capita are 1.4%, 3.2% and 4.1%, 
respectively. These figures are taken from Nayyar (2006, Table 2) and reveal that there are two high 
growth phases in the Indian economy – during the 1980s and since the 1990s. Among economies with 
GDP higher than US$100 billion (2001 PPP), India ranked twelfth in the period 1991-95 and fourth in 
the period 1996-2001, in terms of growth of GDP (Bery and Singh 2007). More on the Indian growth 
story below. 
2 For example, in a recent work, economic historian McCloskey (2011, p. xiii) writes that: “The Big 
Economic Story of our times has not been the Great Recession of 2007-09, unpleasant though it was … 
The Big Economic Story of our times is that the Chinese in 1978 and then the Indians in 1991 adopted 
liberal ideas in the economy, and came to attribute a dignity and a liberty to the bourgeoisie formerly 
denied. And then China and India exploded in economic growth.” 
3 For various facets of the Indian growth story and the relevant debates, see Balakrishnan (2010; 2011). 
4 For example, Bhagwati (2010) relies on Krishna and Setupathy (2011) who use NSS consumption 
expenditure data from 1988, 1994, 2000 and 2005 (the incomparable round in 2000 is handled using   40 
                                                                                                                                          
Deaton’s suggested method) to find that inequality rises and then falls after 1991. Sarkar and Mehta 
(2010) use wage data from the NSS surveys for 1983, 1993-94 and 2004-05 and find that inequality 
falls during 1983-94, but rises between 1994-2005. 
5 In the language of economics, this may be considered as “relative deprivation.” 
6 Bipolarization is also close to one of the dictionary meanings of polarization, e.g. the online Merriam-
Webster dictionary defines polarization as: “division into two opposites” (http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/polarization, accessed on Apr 27, 2011). 
7 However, see Easterly (2002) for a cross-country analysis that shows the benefits of a larger middle 
class for development. Easterly (2002) positions his study within the debate on whether inequality does 
or does not hurt development and uses Aristotle’s insight. 
8 “Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified 
the class antagonisms: Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, 
into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.” (Marx and Engels 
[1848] 1978, p. 474). “… accumulation of misery a necessary condition, corresponding  to the 
accumulation of wealth. Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time, 
accumulation of misery, the torment of labour, slavery, ignorance, brutalization and moral degradation 
at the opposite pole, i.e. on the side of the class that produces its own product as capital” (Marx [1867] 
1977, p. 799). Also see the discussion in Esteban and Ray (1994) who motivate their “identification-
alienation” framework (discussed below) using Marx’s ideas. 
9 See e.g. Giddens (1995) who argues that in his later work, Marx recognized that the middle class was 
increasing in importance and contributing to the dissipation of conflict between the workers and the 
capitalists by strengthening the latter. Note that this is also consistent with the above-discussed idea 
that a strong middle class can mute conflict.  
10 Here, we are using the term “polarization” to refer to bipolarization. In the remainder of this section, 
when we use the term “polarization,” its meaning will be obvious from the context. 
11 Note that polarization curves like Lorenz curves, can cross, thereby yielding an ambiguous 
comparison. Moreover, the polarization index that is derived from the polarization curve would always 
yield an unambiguous comparison (in a manner similar to the Gini, derived from the Lorenz curve).     41 
                                                                                                                                          
12 This property that a relative index could satisfy is referred to as the compromise property 
(Chakravarty 2009, p. 106). The relative Wolfson index is not the only one that satisfies this property. 
We discuss one more example below. Similar concepts and terminology exist in the measurement of 
inequality, although there, we multiply by the mean, see Chakravarty (2009, Ch. 1). 
13 Note that in bipolarization, we are concerned with the poor, the middle and the rich. 
14 In the sense that an individual by him/her self would contribute only marginally.  
15 e.g. see Vidich (1995) and the references therein. Also see the classical literature that we had cited 
earlier. 
16 Reddy and Jayadev (2009) and Jayadev and Reddy (2011) conceptualize polarization in the presence 
of pre-existing identity groups as comprising of three components: segregation, clustering and group 
inequality. They term these components as Representational Inequality (RI), Sequential Inequality (SI) 
and Group Inequality Comparison (GIC), respectively. They show that an index capturing these three 
can be derived, and it will be in multiplicative form: RI*SI*GIC. As is clear, although what they are 
trying to measure can be thought of as multidimensional polarization, their notion of polarization is 
quite different from the one prevailing in the literature, that we have discussed above. 
17 How else can one explain the enormous empirical literature on the question of whether people are 
rational (or not) when standard textbooks on microeconomics (e.g. Mas-Colell et al. 1995, p. 5) talk 
about “rationality axioms”? 
18 For example, on critiques of anonymity and replication invariance, see Cowell (1998) and 
Subramanian (2006), respectively. 
19 Using data from the NSS 43
rd round (1988-89, a few years before the reforms) does not change our 
results much. 
20 The reports for various rounds can be downloaded from the NSSO (2011) website, at the following 
URL: http://mospi.gov.in/nsso_4aug2008/web/nsso/reports.htm 
21 If the same deflator can be used, given that we are using relative measures, whether we use the 
deflator or not (i.e. whether we use real or nominal values) does not matter. 
22 As is standard in the literature on India (see the above mentioned references, but also most studies on 
poverty, e.g. Deaton and Dreze 2002), we do not use an explicit equivalence scale.   42 
                                                                                                                                          
23 We have computed these percentages from the actual (i.e. not rounded-off) values and then rounded 
these off to one decimal. Hence, they will not exactly match the percentages calculated from Tables 1 
or 4. This is also true of the percentages during 1994-2005 that we discuss below.  
24 We do not report the rural and urban rates of change in polarization and inequality indices, but these 
are available on request from the authors. Comparing these rates for polarization and inequality, we 
note that they are different. 
25 We discuss these caste groups in detail below, in the context of multidimensional polarization. 
26 There is a very small percentage (about 3%) of individuals who live in urban areas and who belong 
to Scheduled Tribes (ST). Given this, a small percentage of ST individuals belong to the poorer half. 
27 The NSS classifies occupations into 9 groups: Legislators, Senior Officials and Managers; 
Professionals; Technicians and Associate Professionals; Clerks; Service Workers & Shop and Market 
Workers; Skilled Agricultural and Fishery Workers; Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers; and 
Elementary Occupations. Broadly speaking, as one goes down this list, occupations become less skilled 
and less paid. 
28 For sophisticated analyses of caste, see Gupta (1993) and Chatterjee (1993). 
29  One indication of this is that the number of Indian super rich (billionaires) has been increasing in 
recent years – from 49 to 55 during 2010-11. During the same period, their wealth increased from 
$222.1 to $246.5 billion (Karmali (2011), which is based upon the list in Forbes magazine).  
30 Since the 1990s, movements for regional autonomy/statehood (e.g. in Andhra Pradesh), inter-state 
conflict over resources like water (e.g. between Tamil Nadu and Karnataka), conflicts within and 
between states over migrants (e.g. Maharashtra and Bihar) have seen renewed vigor. The Naxalite 
movement spanning several states, which is dominant today in regions that are rich in mineral 
resources (e.g. Chhatisgarh) where the interests of the indigenous groups are pitted against those of 
others, has also seen a resurgence. 
31 See Jayadev et al. (2007a) on wealth accumulation and Vakulabharanam et al. (2010) on 
consumption of various classes. 
32 See for example the controversy and discussions surrounding Antilia, the 27-floor house built by the 
wealthiest person in India (Mukesh Ambani) in the affluent part (South) of Mumbai. This is one of the 
most expensive personal residences in the world and according to one recent report consumes as much   43 
                                                                                                                                          
as five lakh litres of water per month (Deshpande 2011). The connection to the situation described in 
Kurosawa’s film (quoted at the beginning) is inescapable. 